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Crisis  
 
Amy Krings Loyola University Chicago, USA  
Dana Kornberg University of Michigan, USA  
Erin Lane University of Michigan, USA  
 
Abstract  
 
What might it take for politically marginalized residents to challenge cuts in public 
spending that threaten to harm their health and wellbeing? Specifically, how did residents 
of Flint, Michigan contribute to the decision of an austerity regime, which was not 
accountable to them, to spend millions to switch to a safe water source? Relying on 
evidence from key interviews and newspaper accounts, we examine the influence and 
limitations of residents and grassroots groups during the 18-month period between April 
2014 and October 2015 when the city drew its water from the Flint River. We find that 
citizen complaints alone were not sufficiently able to convince city officials or national 
media of widespread illness caused by the water. However, their efforts resulted in 
partnerships with researchers whose evidence bolstered their claims, thus inspiring a 
large contribution from a local foundation to support the switch to a clean water source. 
Thus, before the crisis gained national media attention, and despite significant 
constraints, residents’ sustained organization—coupled with scientific evidence that 
credentialed local claims—motivated the return to the Detroit water system. The Flint 
case suggests that residents seeking redress under severe austerity conditions may require 
partnerships with external scientific elites.  
 
Introduction  
 
On April 25, 2014, after nearly 50 years of purchasing Lake Huron water from the City of 
Detroit, Michigan, the City of Flint, Michigan, began to pump inadequately treated water 
from the Flint River into residents’ homes. The results, as we know now, were disastrous. 
Residents immediately noticed discolored and foul-smelling liquid coming from their 
taps. Reports of rashes, hair loss, and respiratory illnesses soon followed, and later blood 
lead levels in children spiked. The decision to switch to the Flint River water was made 
while the city was controlled by an austerity-driven emergency manager (EM) who was 
mandated to cut city expenses and had the political power to dispense with elected city 
leadership, which severely limited Flint residents’ recourse when their water quality 
dramatically declined. While local media covered residents’ concerns, the national media 
did not provide sustained attention until late 2015, following the switch back to the 
Detroit system.  
 
How did Flint residents and grassroots groups contribute to a switch back to the safer, yet 
more expensive, Detroit water system 18 months later in October 2015? Within this 
economically and politically constrained context, Flint residents—a majority of whom 
were poor and African American—questioned officials, protested, and organized 
themselves while officials discredited, minimized, and ignored their claims. However, 
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local efforts led to support from credible institutions with the capacity to document and 
disseminate evidence of the contaminated water and its dangerous health effects. This 
scientific evidence led to a large donation from a local philanthropic institution and, 
ultimately, the switch back to the Detroit water system. The Flint water case moves 
studies of austerity politics beyond locating the character and impacts of neoliberal 
policies to understanding how they might be contested by attracting resources that are 
perceived as credible by neoliberal austerity regimes.  
 
Urban Austerity and the Erosion of Local Accountability  
 
A central feature of neoliberal governance in the United States has been the production of 
austerity conditions in cities. Jamie Peck (2012) has described how urban austerity 
regimes emerge through processes of scalar dumping, whereby financial responsibility 
for public goods is passed down from national to state and local governments. The logical 
priority that scalar dumping sets in motion is clear: cash-strapped cities must either raise 
revenue through taxes, fees, or service costs for public goods or they must cut spending 
(Birkenholtz, 2010; Copeland, 2012). Scalar dumping disproportionately strains cities 
like Flint, which have already suffered severely because of deindustrialization, residential 
abandonment, aging infrastructure, high poverty rates, and racial segregation. Thus, 
although a city’s municipal budget is shaped by a range of economic factors beyond the 
control of city leaders, financial hardships tend to be borne by residents.  
 
When cities fail to be self-sufficient, officials may employ legal tools such as emergency 
management laws to label budget shortfalls as financial “emergencies.” This 
characterization can provide justification for punitive intervention—including democratic 
curtailment coupled with cuts to public services—by higher levels of government (state, 
national, or international) (Hayes, 2017). Thus, austerity is indeed a “politically imposed 
condition” (Peck, 2012: 637). Additionally, by characterizing the city as experiencing a 
fiscal emergency, policies that entail additional public spending are removed from 
contention and effectively blocked from the political agenda. And by focusing on the 
short-term alleviation of fiscal problems, longer-term structural problems—such as the 
loss of revenue due to a declining tax base, decreases in state revenue sharing, and 
growing unemployment—are cast outside the sphere of public debate (Desan and 
Steinmetz, 2015; Fasenfest and Pride, 2016).  
 
Despite Michigan’s history as a labor movement stronghold, the state’s recent political 
and demographic changes have made it ripe for neoliberal policies that emphasize local 
austerity measures, including emergency management, as antidotes to economic 
problems. Michigan has been one of 16 US states with a provision for the state 
government to shift local decisionmaking authority away from elected city leaders to an 
appointed EM under conditions of financial distress (see Scorsone, 2014). The EM—
whose job is to balance the city’s budget without raising taxes or renegotiating debt with 
creditors—is accountable to the governor and State Treasury Department officials rather 
than to city council members, thereby reducing opportunities for citizen groups to 
influence local policies (Lee et al., 2016). This has further consolidated the Republican-
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held state government’s power, while weakening the Democrat-majority city 
governments.  
 
Social action is increasingly necessary to counter the dangerous effects of austerity 
policies, yet the possibilities for democratic influence have been severely curtailed. 
Additionally, as environmental regulatory rules are relaxed, “the operating principle is 
that toxic chemicals are presumed innocent of harming human health unless proven 
guilty” (Gibbs, 2002: 103).  
 
In this article, we demonstrate how a curtailed public sphere presented severe challenges 
for Flint residents who organized to gain redress for their contaminated drinking water. 
Taking the October 2015 switch back to Detroit water as a significant, if severely belated 
win, we ask what might it take for those who suffer most under austerity regimes to 
effectively secure policies that support public spending and local decision-making 
authority? We find that shifting the politics of discredit is especially important because 
austerity regimes are able to rapidly dispel residents’ claims by challenging their 
credibility.  
 
Research Design  
 
The Flint water crisis was produced by a series of political decisions rooted in a logic of 
austerity and driven by a desire to cut municipal spending in a political context without 
local democratic accountability. A retrospective look is useful for revitalizing the idea 
that history could have happened differently and understanding why events unfolded 
when and how they did.  
 
To trace how the politics of credibility shifted between the decision to switch the city’s 
water source in April 2014 until October 2015, when the city returned to Detroit water, 
we created a database of 329 Flint Journal/MLive articles published between January 
2010 and July 2016, which we located through Newsbank, using the search terms “Flint 
River” and “pipes,” “pipeline,” or “rates.” We triangulated our data by reviewing national 
media coverage from the same time period and original sources, including internal 
documents that were released by Governor Rick Snyder’s administration after the 
contamination was exposed. We also interviewed a Flint Journal reporter, a grassroots 
activist, an investigative reporter from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of 
Michigan, and the president of the Flint-based Mott Foundation. Our respondents were 
identified because of their ability to explain when and how citizen organizing was able to 
secure institutional alliances or persuade officials. Finally, we took original field notes at 
key public events in which residents described how they came to question public officials 
and, ultimately, press them to take their demands seriously. Our strategy of focusing on 
local media coverage in addition to primary sources provides the benefit of more 
complete coverage, as the Flint Journal followed the story in-depth from its beginning.  
 
As part of our analysis, we looked for spaces of resistance, particularly examples of how 
citizen groups were able to suggest alternatives to city and state discourses of austerity. 
 4 
We coded the database to track the ways in which the credibility of city and state 
institutions, officials, residents, and scientists was strengthened or challenged.  
 
The Flint Water Crisis and Local Influence  
 
Between 2011 and 2015, Flint was placed under emergency management, and four 
consecutive EMs were appointed by Michigan Governor Rick Snyder to balance the 
city’s budget by cutting expenditures. Among these expenditures were those for Flint’s 
water source: while Flint had, since 1967, purchased its drinking water from the Great 
Lakes Water Authority (formerly the regional Detroit Water and Sewerage Department), 
in 2012, Ed Kurtz, the first of Flint’s four EMs, suggested that Flint join the new regional 
Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA), which was building its own pipeline to Lake Huron 
and would bring down costs (Lynch and Ramirez, 2016). The cost savings Kurtz 
promised were significant—$5 million during the first year of service, $19 million after 
eight years, and between $100 and $300 million over 25 years (Counts, 2016a, 2016b)—
and with these numbers, debate about whether to switch to the KWA was relatively short-
lived. In April 2013, city leaders, including Kurtz, Mayor Dayne Walling, and the city 
council, agreed to join the KWA. The Flint City Council and many of its residents 
supported the KWA with the hope that it would lower water bills that were among the 
highest in the country (Longley, 2012).  
 
However, because construction of the KWA would not be completed for two years after 
Flint’s contract with Detroit was set to expire, the city needed a plan to supply water in 
the interim. Pressure on the EM to cut costs coupled with the impending end of the 
Detroit contract led to hasty decisions, with minimal regulatory oversight or citizen input. 
Flint’s second EM, Darnell Earley, proposed that, by temporarily drawing its own water 
from the Flint River, the city could avoid two years of paying for the expensive Detroit 
water. Because of the EM, this decision did not require a vote by city council and likely 
would not have received public support given the widespread perception that the river 
was contaminated by decades of industrial waste (Longley, 2011). Nonetheless, Major 
Walling announced the decision to change Flint’s water source to the public with little 
warning in March 2014: “In less than 50 days,” he declared, “Flint residents will begin 
drinking water from the Flint River” (Adams, 2014a). Due to cost and time constraints, 
upgrades needed for the water plant were severely underfunded: four months before the 
switch, the city had spent just $3.8 million (Adams, 2014b), even though a 2011 Rowe 
Engineering report had estimated that around $60 million in upgrades were required to 
make the river treatment plant a safe, full-time source of drinking water (Longley, 2011). 
Despite these difficulties, on April 25, 2015, city and state officials raised glasses of 
water to celebrate as water began to flow from the Flint River.  
 
Residents Question Water Safety While Officials Minimize Concerns  
 
The consequences of the swift undemocratic process by which the city switched to Flint 
River water were almost immediately apparent: residents complained that their water was 
discolored, bad tasting, and foul smelling. As the water quality worsened, residents had 
few outlets to report their problems because the city council had limited authority and the 
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Office of the Ombudsman had been eliminated. When complaints about the water quality 
were made, representatives of the agencies charged with monitoring the safety of the 
water—the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) and the Flint 
Department of Public Works— sought to reassure the public. Officials of MDEQ 
acknowledged that the river water was different from Detroit’s Lake Huron source, but 
denied any serious problems, reporting that the water met “all quality standards set by the 
state” (Fonger, 2014a). Department of Public Works Director Howard Croft asked 
residents to be patient, acknowledging how hurried the process had been: “city water 
plant workers have had a crash course in learning how to treat river water” (Fonger, 
2014b). Residents whose water was discolored remained skeptical of MDEQ’s 
assurances, and while some began to purchase bottled water and filters, many did not 
have the means and continued to drink, cook with, and bathe in the city water. In an early 
protest, some residents brought bottles of their discolored water to City Hall, but their 
actions were largely ignored or framed as unfounded.  
 
The Flint-based Democracy Defense League (DDL), which was established in 2011 to 
oppose the state’s emergency management law, provided early support to residents who 
were concerned about the water quality. For years prior to the switch, the volunteer 
members of the group met to educate Flint residents about the authority that the state law 
granted to EMs to amend collective bargaining contracts, cut or privatize city services, 
and sell off public assets without local input (N. Shariff, personal communication, March 
22, 2017). The Democracy Defense League, which employed a race- and class-based 
analysis of the emergency management system and its impacts, sought to “confront 
fascism by challenging our local dictator” (N. Shariff, personal communication, March 
22, 2017). Consequently, when residents complained about their expensive and 
undrinkable water, members of the DDL were prepared to document concerns, frame 
them as a consequence of emergency management, and pressure city leaders to stop 
charging residents high water rates for a product that they could not use. However, these 
concerns were also largely dismissed, in part because officials questioned the credibility 
of people who had been protesting emergency management and its impacts for years. As 
Flint Journal reporter Ron Fonger explained: “There’s John Smith. He was protesting the 
garbage company contract and now he’s protesting the water” (personal communication, 
February 23, 2017). Moreover, because not everyone was impacted to the same degree, 
there was skepticism that protesters’ complaints were exaggerated (N. Shariff, personal 
communication, March 22, 2017)—which served not only to discredit protesters, but also 
to further deprive them of avenues toward redress.  
 
While the concerns of residents were largely dismissed, when the leadership of General 
Motors (GM) noticed a decline in its water quality, state leaders took those concerns 
seriously. In October 2014, six months after the switch, the company announced that it 
had negotiated a deal to return to the Detroit system because the Flint River water was 
corroding car parts within its Flint manufacturing plant (Fonger, 2014c). This solution 
allowed the corporate entity to opt out of the water system, but did nothing to transform 
the system overall.  
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Unlike GM, however, neither Flint residents nor the city council elected to represent 
them had the power to maneuver around the EM’s decision. The city council had been 
largely disempowered by the emergency management laws, and though some of its 
members began to suggest abandoning the Flint River, it had no authority to approve a 
switch back to Detroit. Flint City Council members such as Monica Galloway questioned 
whether state officials were taking concerns about human health seriously and, at the 
same time, made it clear that the emergency management structure had circumvented the 
council’s democratic mandate: “This is just another thing that says to me (that) we are 
like guinea pigs … It’s like a research project … that we would normally do on rats” 
(Fonger, 2014c). In fact, while officials eventually determined that the metal corrosion of 
GM car parts was the result of high levels of chloride—the same chemical later 
recognized as the source of corroding lead service pipes—state and city regulators failed 
to raise concerns about the potential harm to residents’ health. Furthermore, critics have 
noted that the decision to allow GM to change its water source represented a missed 
opportunity for national media to take up the Flint water crisis. In fact, national media 
remained largely silent on the issue until December 2015—two months after the switch 
back to Detroit’s water system following Mayor Karen Weaver’s declared state of 
emergency.  
 
The GM decision revealed how this politics of credibility is rooted in racial biases. Some 
Flint residents explicitly named and confronted this bias, particularly after the city issued 
a public warning in January 2015 that the water contained high levels of total 
trihalomethanes (TTHMs), carcinogenic byproducts of chemicals used to combat the 
prior bacteria outbreak, which can cause permanent damage to the kidneys, liver, and 
nervous system (Fonger, 2015a; Olson, 2016). During a January 2015 public meeting, a 
Flint woman castigated public officials: “Look at that water! … None of you white 
people would drink that water” (Carmody, 2015a). Mayor Walling, who is white, tried to 
reassure the audience: “The city water is safe to drink. My family and I drink it and use it 
every day” (Carmody, 2015b).  
 
The city’s TTHM notice helped explain why the water tasted and smelled like chemicals. 
However, it also revealed that officials knew of the TTHM problem as early as May 
2014, which incensed many residents and caused them to question officials’ credibility 
and care for their wellbeing (Fonger, 2015a). During that time period, residents had 
likened the taste and smell of the water to an over-chlorinated swimming pool. Some 
reported that their hair was falling out, and resident Amber Hasan complained that her 
eyes would burn while showering and that she had trouble seeing afterwards (L. Smith, 
2016b). Local journalist Ron Fonger described how officials’ lack of concern caused him 
to question the credibility of official reassurances: “TTHMs are a reason that you ought 
to be concerned … And why do we have these high levels of TTHMs when we never had 
them when we were on Detroit water?” (R. Fonger, private communication, February 23, 
2017).  
 
State officials, including MDEQ Director Steve Busch, began to take a different 
rhetorical approach to minimize the water problems. Busch began to acknowledge that 
there were health concerns, but he framed them as individual rather than widespread 
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troubles. By underplaying government accountability, he urged residents to take personal 
responsibility: “Is there a risk in the short term? That depends on you … It’s an 
individual thing … . You can make a judgment (after talking to your doctor)” (Fonger, 
2015a). Individuals and institutions with the resources to do so began to take their own 
precautions. Flint Head Start programs stopped using city water, and it was later 
discovered that state leaders arranged to have purified water delivered for employees at 
Flint’s State Office Building (Egan, 2016). In January 2016, the University of Michigan-
Flint independently tested for lead on its campus and found contaminated water (Schuch, 
2015). In retrospect, this too should have been cause for more rigorous and widespread 
testing. Instead, the university shut down drinking fountains on that part of campus. Like 
GM, these institutions were able to remove themselves from the city’s water system. 
Meanwhile, residents like Claire McClinton, a local leader of DDL, expressed deep 
incredulity: “We survived bacteria. We’ve had boil water advisories as a result. They put 
too much chloride in the water, we’ve got trihalomethanes, and it’s just been one disaster 
after another … I mean, what do we have to do to get them to turn the water back on to 
Detroit?” (L. Smith, 2016b).  
 
Flint Residents Discover Lead  
 
A series of events that began with resident LeeAnne Walters was unfolding that would 
produce a new public health concern: lead contamination. Following the switch to the 
Flint River, the water in Walters’s home was consistently discolored, and her children 
were becoming sick after swimming in the family pool. Walters called Flint’s utilities 
technician, Mike Glasgow, to test the water in her home. After he found extremely high 
lead levels, Glasgow instructed Walters to prevent her family members from drinking, 
swimming, or bathing in the water. Glasgow continued to test the water at the Walters 
home on a weekly basis and found that the amount of lead was steadily increasing. 
Walters, who was better off financially than many of her fellow residents, had the health 
insurance and transportation necessary to take her children to a medical specialist in a 
nearby city, and one of them was diagnosed with lead poisoning (L. Smith, 2015).  
 
Although Glasgow took the Walters’s case seriously, higher level city and state officials 
characterized the lead in her water as an outlier rather than a systemic problem. Blaming 
the lead in her home’s outdated pipes, officials again resorted to the neoliberal idea of 
individual over public responsibility, thereby avoiding responsibility for a systemic 
intervention. The city’s fourth EM, Jerry Ambrose, focused on tests showing the city’s 
water to be safe, insisting that the “city water now [was] within all acceptable guidelines” 
and claiming that any issues were short-term matters of aesthetics that the city could 
quickly resolve (Fonger, 2015b). Opportunities for widespread testing, which could have 
resulted in earlier intervention, were ignored. Ambrose maintained that a switch back to 
the Detroit system was out of the question because of its high cost—a decision that 
accords with his austerity mandate, which required increased spending in one area to 
necessitate cuts in another. Thus, at the very moment that citizen concerns were 
crystallizing into a demand to switch back to the Detroit water system, the EM 
maintained that Flint would continue to draw its water from the Flint River until the 
KWA line was completed.  
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LeeAnne Walters, however, did not believe officials when they said that the lead had 
come from her home’s individual plumbing. Her home had plastic pipes; the culpable 
source had to be the water system itself. Walters’s outrage about the harm to her children 
began to take aim at public officials: “After the fact, knowing I was giving this to my kids 
makes me sick, because we should be able to trust the fact that we’re paying for this 
service and we should be able to trust the fact that it’s not going to harm our kids” (L. 
Smith, 2016b). Walters’s belief that public officials were misleading residents in a way 
that could jeopardize the health of other children led her to reach out to scientists who 
could test and verify the scope of lead contamination in Flint’s water system.  
 
Alliances with Scientists and the Collection of Credible Evidence  
 
Sustained grassroots pressure eventually contributed to the switch back to Detroit’s safe 
water supply, but public concerns alone were insufficient due to the severely curtailed 
public sphere. Ultimately, residents like LeeAnne Walters and grassroots groups such as 
the DDL had to ally themselves with national activists, government employees, 
academics, and scientists in order to amass evidence of their grievances that would be 
deemed credible by government institutions. This was necessary in order to counter 
claims of the state power structure, including the EM and MDEQ, who sought to reassure 
the public while discrediting their concerns. Living under an austerity regime that would 
allow for neither additional municipal spending nor democratic opposition meant that 
concerns about the water’s safety were both deprioritized and delegitimized. 
Consequently, residents and private actors became responsible for documenting and 
responding to a burgeoning public health crisis.  
 
There were several major shifts in local organizing strategies and tactics over the course 
of the crisis that strengthened the credibility of citizen claims against the state. First, 
residents and grassroots groups began to understand that the problems they had each 
discovered were connected and caused by a flawed system. Melissa Mays, who joined 
with LeeAnne Walters to form the grassroots group Water You Fighting For?, described 
this process: “First, we had to get residents organized and demonstrate that we weren’t 
crazy. Second, we had to convince ourselves that we deserve better” (M. Mays, private 
communication, March 7, 2017). This growth in confidence that residents’ concerns were 
valid was particularly necessary to combat official efforts to discredit, minimize, or 
ignore complaints.  
 
Second, existing grassroots groups including the DDL and Concerned Pastors for Social 
Action, a coalition of faith leaders, began to focus on Flint’s water problems, joining with 
emerging groups like Water You Fighting For? to establish the Flint Coalition for Clean 
Water. By incorporating multiple groups within a single coalition, members could 
simultaneously address immediate health concerns and continue to advocate for a return 
to the Detroit system. For example, in April 2016, the coalition sought legal action 
against the city and began to document complaints about the water and related medical 
issues (Nagl, 2015). Meanwhile, the Concerned Pastors for Social Action worked to 
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distribute donated bottled water and filters to residents who could not afford them while 
demanding a shift in the water source.  
 
The third notable shift included efforts to secure the support of national activists, 
government employees, and scientists, whose credentials and institutional affiliations 
would lend greater credibility and legitimacy to residents’ growing concerns. LeeAnne 
Walters, who had grown increasingly wary of reassurances provided by MDEQ and city 
officials, was particularly active in this effort. Notably absent from this group, however, 
were national media outlets, which did not reliably cover the water problems in Flint until 
December 2015—two months after the switch back to the Detroit water system (Jackson, 
2017).  
 
Residents reached out to environmental activist Erin Brockovich, who sent national water 
quality expert Robert Bowcock to independently test Flint water. Following a public 
march and rally on a cold February day, Bowcock reported his findings: “Every time 
[Flint water officials] had a problem, they threw another chemical at it” (Fonger, 2015c). 
The discovery of high chemical use strengthened the credibility of residents when they 
complained about the water burning their eyes, causing their hair to fall out, and smelling 
like a swimming pool. His findings began to chip away at city and state officials’ 
reassurances to the public and to undermine their credibility.  
 
The Bowcock report, along with increasing citizen pressure, paved the way for new 
alliances with public officials, including the city council and EPA. Under the emergency 
management law, elected city council members had limited legal authority; however, in 
March 2015, they took a symbolic vote to “do all things necessary” to reconnect to the 
Detroit water (M. Smith, 2015). The EM responded by digging in his heels and 
reiterating that the city would not return to the Detroit system. Instead, he established two 
water advisory committees and hired external consulting firm Veolia to assess the city’s 
water testing and distribution practices.  
 
When Veolia’s tests concluded that Flint’s water met all state and federal safe drinking 
standards, residents and some city council representatives were not convinced. These 
claims were not supported by their lived experiences. Thus, Flint council members and 
residents began to express their distrust more overtly, directly challenging the credibility 
of city and state officials. Council Member Kerry Nelson responded with open defiance: 
“I will not tell any of the residents I represent to drink the water” (Fonger, 2015d). 
Resident Jacqueline Hill was indignant, accusing officials of deceit: “We have been 
getting people telling us the water is fine, but when I cut my tap on, it still smells … This 
water is not fine. You all are lying to us” (Fonger, 2015e).  
 
Walters, meanwhile, was growing more suspicious that the city and state’s reassurances 
would cause other Flint children to be poisoned by lead. After the strategic partnership 
with Brockovich and Bowcock, she continued to seek out legitimizing institutions and 
allies who could independently test the water. In the first of several alliances that would 
prove crucial to uncovering the extent of the lead contamination, Walters contacted the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) groundwater and drinking water regulation 
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manager Miguel Del Toral to report the extraordinarily high levels of lead that city water 
testers had found in her home. Del Toral visited the Walters’s home and became alarmed 
by the dangerously high levels of lead that he found. He followed up with MDEQ for 
answers and, like Walters, grew concerned that state officials were not properly treating 
or monitoring the Flint water. In a letter to MDEQ and EPA officials, Del Toral argued 
that reassurances from MDEQ were dangerous because they “could provide a false sense 
of security to the residents of Flint regarding lead levels in their water and may result in 
residents not taking necessary precautions to protect their families from lead in water” 
(Del Toral, 2015). He then leaked this letter to Walters, who shared it with other 
residents, reporters, and investigative journalist Curt Guyette of the Michigan ACLU, 
who had been chronicling the impacts associated with emergency management 
throughout the state (L. Smith, 2016a).  
 
While attention to Flint’s water contamination was rising—and so too the legitimacy of 
the residents’ complaints—the leaked Del Toral letter proved pivotal because it was the 
first time that someone in an official capacity attested to the veracity of residents’ 
concerns. Local reporters turned to MDEQ for answers, putting the department on the 
defensive. Brad Wurfel, spokesman for MDEQ, tried to quickly dispel these concerns: 
“Let me start here—anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water in Flint 
can relax” (L. Smith, 2015). Wurfel reasoned that Flint’s water quality was no different 
than Detroit’s or any other city’s, and he suggested that anyone with a house more than 
30 years old could contact the city to have their water tested (L. Smith, 2015). Wurfel 
employed the same dismissive rhetoric previously used by the MDEQ director to convert 
widespread concerns into personal problems that required individual responsibility.  
 
With the leaked Walters memo, concerns about the water quality were rising, and 
pressure on MDEQ and the governor’s office was growing. Still, concerns about Flint’s 
water quality had not earned sufficient cachet to contest the austerity regime and force a 
switch back to the Detroit water. A trickle of national media outlets covered stories on 
Flint’s water between March and October of 2015, but the story was not yet national 
headline news (Jackson, 2017). Thus, residents, including LeeAnne Walters, continued to 
build strategic alliances that would help to strengthen the legitimacy of their claims while 
their sustained pressure got the attention of other partner advocates. In August 2015, at 
Del Toral’s suggestion, Walters called Marc Edwards, an engineering professor at 
Virginia Tech who had gained a reputation for exposing lead contamination in 
Washington, DC’s water supply (Lurie, 2016). Walters mailed water samples from her 
home to Edwards who, like Del Toral, was shocked by the high levels of lead 
contamination. In response, Edwards and some of his students traveled to Flint to 
collaborate with the Flint Rising Coalition and its grassroots members including 
Concerned Pastors for Social Action, Water You Fighting For?, and the Democracy 
Defense League. Together, the Virginia Tech team and leaders from the Flint community 
trained citizen volunteers, who systematically collected more than 300 water samples 
across the city. The Virginia Tech-Flint Water Study test results substantiated local 
concerns: lead levels were roughly two times higher than city tests had indicated 
(Guyette, 2015a). Edwards was able to explain the difference in the findings by detailing 
how the city’s water testers intentionally flushed out pipes before collecting samples and 
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avoided sampling homes that had lead service lines (Brush, 2015; Guyette, 2015b). These 
findings, coupled with the discovery that MDEQ and the city had relaxed testing rules, 
further unseated official regulatory bodies as trusted authorities.  
 
Although representatives from MDEQ and the EPA acknowledged the results of the 
Virginia Tech-Flint Water Study behind closed doors, state officials were still publicly 
reassuring residents while discrediting Edwards and his results. In an internal email, state 
officials described how the study was “putting added pressure” on MDEQ and that any 
delay for corrosion control treatment “would likely cause even higher levels of lead” 
(Spangler, 2016). In public, however, representatives of MDEQ, the EPA, and the 
governor’s office characterized residents as hysterical; Del Toral (who had been removed 
from the Flint case due to leaking his memo) as a “rogue” employee; and Edwards as an 
academic whose warnings about lead should be questioned because, according to MDEQ 
spokesperson Brad Wurfel, he and his Virginia Tech research team were known to “pull 
that rabbit out of that hat everywhere they go” (L. Smith, 2016a; M. Smith, 2016). Still, 
even while they asserted that residents had nothing to fear, the strength of their rhetoric 
suggests an acknowledgement that institutional forces had begun to ally against them, 
and MDEQ—in a significant shift—quietly told Flint officials to improve their water 
treatment system to reduce exposure to lead from plumbing in homes (Fonger, 2015f).  
 
The echoes of residents’ protests eventually made their way into the hallways of local 
institutions. In early October 2015, the credibility of their charges was further bolstered 
when Mona Hanna-Attisha, director of Flint’s Hurley Medical Center Pediatric 
Residency Program, released a study that revealed a statistically significant increase in 
blood lead levels of children. Hanna Attisha found that the areas of Flint with the highest 
lead levels in household water, as identified by the Virginia Tech-Flint Water Study, 
were also where the most dramatic increases in infant and children’s blood lead levels 
occurred (Fonger, 2015g). She and the president of the Hurley Medical Center called for 
a return to the Detroit water system.  
 
Once again, state officials responded to these contradictory findings and calls for a switch 
back to Detroit water by questioning the legitimacy of the results. In an internal memo, 
Dennis Muchmore, the governor’s chief of staff, continued to characterize residents as 
irrational: “we have the anti-everything group turning to the lead content which is a 
concern for everyone, but DEQ and DHHS [Department of Health and Human Services] 
and EPA can’t find evidence of a major change … Of course, some of the Flint people 
respond by looking for someone to blame instead of working to reduce anxiety” (Bosman 
et al., 2016). Despite the backlash, Hanna-Attisha stood by her findings and, on October 
1, 2015, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services confirmed that blood 
lead levels in children and infants had indeed spiked.  
 
Although pressure had been building for some time, Hanna-Attisha’s findings were 
widely credited as the catalyst for other institutions, most notably the Flint-based Mott 
Foundation, to provide the economic and political resources that finally pushed Governor 
Snyder to allow the city of Flint to return to the Detroit water system. Ridgway White, 
president of the Mott Foundation, explained how Hanna-Attisha’s report convinced him 
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and the foundation’s board members to donate $4 million to subsidize the cost of the 
switch. Although Mott staff had previously complained internally about the water quality, 
with the documentation provided by Hanna-Attisha, he explained: “We had the data for 
me to be able to call the governor and say, ‘Hey, this is our hometown … We’re here to 
help’” (personal communication, March 22, 2017). The Mott donation, coupled with the 
$2 million from the city, permitted state legislators to avoid accusations that the state 
funds amounted to a “bailout,” which was likely to draw backlash from suburban rural 
white legislators whose constituents tend to oppose funding for majority-black Michigan 
cities.  
 
The widespread acceptance and dissemination of Hanna-Attisha’s results, which 
demonstrated a clear rise in child lead poisoning, were facilitated by her status as a 
medical doctor, which meant that not only was she “credentialed,” but she was perceived 
as neutral in a way that residents with discolored bottles, skin rashes, and clumps of hair 
were not. Further, because the findings complemented those of the Virginia Tech-Flint 
Water Study, the body of credible evidence began to tilt in favor of those who warned of 
the water’s danger. As journalist Ron Fonger explained, “All of a sudden, we went from 
having [residents] saying, ‘something is wrong with the water’ to having some nationally 
recognized people saying, ‘Yes, this water is a mess. Here’s what’s happening and here’s 
why it’s happening’” (private communication, February 23, 2017). He continued: “The 
final blow that knocked over this whole house of cards for the State and the City … was 
when Dr. Mona came out with her study … It’s like the whole institution of Flint shifted” 
(private communication, February 23, 2017).  
 
Thus, it was the evidence collected by credentialed experts, combined with financial 
incentives from the Mott Foundation that led Governor Snyder to allow Flint to return to 
the Detroit water system on October 16, 2015. Nevertheless the damage was done. After 
18 months of drawing its water from the Flint River, a new public health emergency 
multiplied Flint’s existing fiscal crises and resulted in the betrayal of citizen trust.  
 
Discussion  
 
Financial constraints, together with limited options for citizen opposition, motivated a 
series of decisions that culminated in the Flint water crisis. This cost-cutting austerity-
regime imperative rushed a change in the water supply before treatment plant workers 
and safety mechanisms were prepared and resulted in insufficient treatment and 
monitoring of the Flint River water. When residents complained about their poor water 
quality, a series of EMs asserted that any alternative to the Flint River source would be 
cost prohibitive. However, following three boil water advisories, the discovery of TTHM 
in the water, and General Motors’ change to the Detroit system due to corroding car 
parts, residents continued to mobilize and call for a return to the safer yet more expensive 
Detroit water system.  
 
The people of Flint—like many of those affected by austerity measures—were 
disadvantaged by systemic racism and classism and were thus at high risk of having their 
statements and experiences discredited. Officials responded to complaints by framing 
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water issues as temporary and by characterizing health problems as individualized, thus 
suggesting the response of personal medical care rather than investments in public 
infrastructure. Because the usual pathways to local accountability were foreclosed by 
emergency management, when Flint’s city council voted to do “everything in its power” 
to force a switch back to the Detroit water system in March 2015, the EM was 
empowered to ignore their wishes. Further, as national media failed to cover the 
unfolding health crisis in Flint, citizen claims were largely ignored. Citizen influence was 
thus triply limited: first by the dominance of the cost-savings mandate, second by an 
autocratic regime in which EMs were able to make decisions without formal 
accountability to local citizens, and third by national media that “utterly failed to capture 
and depict all the agency and self-empowerment of the populace to speak for themselves” 
(Jackson, 2017).  
 
Given these economic, political, and social constraints, how did Flint residents contribute 
to the change in their water source? The switch back to Detroit water happened, in part, 
because local efforts resulted in securing the support of credentialed people and 
institutions that used a quantitative language that is privileged within neoliberal logic. 
When presented with the body of evidence culminating from the Bowcock report, the 
Virginia Tech-Flint Water Study, and Hanna-Attisha, outside institutions—including the 
Mott Foundation—were moved to provide the additional political and economic 
resources necessary to finally facilitate a change back to the Detroit system. Even after 
the change in the water source, these data were used to inform belated national and 
international media attention.  
 
Marc Edwards and Mona Hanna-Attisha, who were based at a nationally acclaimed 
university and a locally reputable hospital, respectively, made it possible for local 
residents’ concerns to be taken seriously by regulatory institutions including the MDEQ. 
Their studies amplified residents’ public claims by effectively translating them into the 
language of scientific expertise. Furthermore, their findings discredited official expertise 
by revealing that city and state workers had manipulated testing procedures to produce 
favorable results. The ability to “verify” what residents had described for months 
mattered for at least two reasons. First, following the release of HannaAttisha’s study, the 
Mott Foundation became willing to subsidize the cost of the switch back to Detroit water 
through a $4 million grant to the city of Flint. Second, following the switch, Mayor Karen 
Weaver declared a state of emergency with the goal of securing support to address local 
health impacts. This call, now bolstered by the Edwards and Hanna-Attisha data, 
provided evidence that national and international journalists began to take seriously. Had 
national media outlets credentialed the predominantly poor and black residents of Flint, 
rather than opting to trust predominately white officials’ reassurances in the midst of 
local claims, it is likely that the state would have intervened earlier to switch back to 
Detroit water (see Jackson 2017). It was also important that the health issues being 
documented—ranging from short-term rashes to longer-term brain damage—were all 
ailments borne by children. In a 2016 community meeting, for example, water activist 
Laura Sullivan acknowledged that this helped their cause: “At first, community members 
who complained were portrayed as hysterical. This changed because kids were impacted” 
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(L. Sullivan, private communication, March 7, 2016). Widely understood as innocent 
victims, children were likely to attract greater sympathy than adults.  
 
Yet while Edwards and Hanna-Attisha have been characterized as the “heroes” of the 
Flint water crisis, their involvement would have been delayed—and perhaps not even 
possible—were it not for the sustained outcry of local residents-turned-activists and 
grassroots groups, whose groundswell of activity provided the information and pressure 
required to get the attention they needed. Ultimately, the change back to Detroit water 
required “a diverse community—not just a few ‘saviors’—who would not believe the lies 
that they were told” (C. Guyette, personal communication, March 7, 2016). Although 
experts’ involvement proved necessary to motivate the switch back, their involvement 
was precipitated by residents “pushing, and pushing, and pushing who would not give up 
… they were the driving force all along and continue to be” (C. Guyette, personal 
communication, March 17, 2017). As Nayyirah Shariff, a local organizer and the 
coordinator of DDL and Flint Rising Coalition, elaborated: “One of the most troubling 
things [following the switch back to Detroit water is] totally erasing the community’s role 
and elevating external spokespeople. Like, Marc Edwards was not just a random person 
who just randomly showed up—there was a lot of work before that” (personal 
communication, March 17, 2017).  
 
Conclusion  
 
The decision to return to Detroit’s water pipeline was a remarkable accomplishment, 
given the extreme budgetary and democratic limits put on the city. However, it must be 
noted that the political system that gave rise to the water crisis—the Michigan emergency 
management law (PA 436)—remains in place. Blame has been placed on employees of 
the city of Flint and of the state, but the system as a whole remains intact. As Clare 
McClintock of Democracy Defense League suggests, “This is a new model of 
governance that is dangerous and unacceptable. And it’s spreading to a town near you” 
(private communication, March 7, 2016).  
 
Permanent damage has been done to the city’s water system, the health of Flint residents, 
and the degree of trust that residents are willing to grant government institutions. Further, 
the health impacts of drinking unsafe water will continue to affect residents for years. 
Although residents and their supporters have demonstrated incredible fortitude in waging 
a protracted struggle for safe and affordable water, the lack of corrosion control in Flint 
has resulted in the deterioration of public infrastructure. Flint has now received federal 
and state funding to assist with pipe replacement, health, and education; the EPA’s lead 
and copper rule is under review; and some public officials have been charged with crimes 
including involuntary manslaughter—all of which is necessary to begin repairing 
physical harm and preventing similar situations from happening elsewhere. More difficult 
to repair, however, is residents’ trust in their institutions. From local emergency 
management curtailing citizen recourse to the EPA’s dismissal of Del Toral’s findings, 
citizens have grown more skeptical that their government is protecting them. With Flint’s 
story spread more widely, perhaps this skepticism can become a provocation to credential 
marginalized residents elsewhere when they are confronted with common threats. 
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